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1lF; C5
In the law of real property, two maxims have long
served to d fine and limit ownership in land. Jand is de-
-fined to be the soil of the earth, including -,-rything
standinz upon or turied beneath its surface; and property
in it is snid to extend upward and downward without limit.
In this theoreticaiidca of indefinite extension from the
heavens Rbove to the very center of the earth below, is emn
braced the first of the maxims: "Cujus est solum ejus usque
ad caelum, et ad infernos".
In this-maxim we find a bropd, and comprehensive
definition of the right, of property, securing to the pro-
prietor of real estate a free and absolute ownership, a perk
feet an4 unrestricted right of enjoynent. He may dig down
iidefinitely ,into the earth, and revel in.its mysteries: he
may build upward as far as he dare t o aspire. In these
directions he has a-pparently nothing to desire; but in
others a difficulty confronts him. He finds himseif sur-
rounded complletely by other land proprietors whose owner-
ship is as full and absolute as his own. He realizes with
alarm that the air he mulst breathe, the water he nmst drink,
t.he light 'thst. he enjoys, come to h.i across the lands of
his neighbors, and may at any moment be interfered with so
as to rendir th~e enjoynent~ ot' his property impossible.
In vie w of the difficulties in this direction,
another maxim came into exi"V;tece: "Sic utere tuo itt alienum
non lIeda,". its obilions limitation upon )the other created
a conftictin c border !and in the law of real property, COn-
stantly presenting new difficulties, the settlement of which
is made none the easier by many dubious Pnd unsatisfactory
precedents.
Among the cases in which litigants have based
their claims of right respectively upon these two maxims,
are those inlolving rights of water. The courts have seen
fit to draw a sharp line of distinction between underground
waters and those that flow upon the surface in well defined
channels, it i , well and uniformly settled that the owner-
ship of land gives only the ri,<ht to a reasonable use of' the
water flowing through it in surface channels, and no per-
manent right of property in the water itself. In o-rher
words, each riparian propiietor of land over which streams
of water flow in well defined surface channels, has a clear
legal right, resu iting from his ownership of the ?.oil, to
have the water of' such streams c ontinu1e in its natural and
accu stomed course, subject only to a reasonable use of such
water by the upper riparian own-rs. And the same principies
are qii}te generally conceded to appl~y to subterranean waters
if they flow, in defined arid known channels.
In this riuu, of' ordiinary mdl reasonable use, the
conrts have drawn, between the conflicting ri. hls and duties
..ecured and iml.osed by the two naxiriis, an admirahle 'ividing
line, osp;sin sufficient esticity to xork cimp -tete
Justice in 1.raciicaliy all cases, anl still ,)ot lacking
in the rigidity essential to a law. The _nile is well stated
by ?,r. Justice ooley, in Duivont. V. Kellogp; (29 Mich. 423),
thus: "As hetwon dii'ferent proprietors on the same stream,
the right of' each qualififis the ot.her, anI the question
ilway.; is, not merely whot.her , .he. lovwef proprietor suffers
damag-e by the use of' the .ater alove him, nor whether the
qiantity i'iowving on is diminished [-y the use, fbut whether,
under all the circumstances oi the case, the use of the
wp+er by one is reasonable a-ld onsistent dth a corresp on-
dent en ioyment of tke right by the other: In determining
the reasonabheness of' the use, the courts have found it con-
ver' :nt t.( vakp n. futrther dlistinction i-.etw(ei so called
ordinary and extraord'.inary uses. Water to supply man's
n-aturai. wants is an ordrinary ise, and to nuply his artific-
LqL wants, an extraordinary use. The re,.i dii'ference pointel
out by the a nthorities between t,e., t o lasses of uses, is
t.hat wat.er may be us .d for ordinary purposes ,aithout regard
to the.eff'ects of such use in of'se + a ,deficiency to those
below on the .-tream, while in reference to the extraordinary
uses, the effect npon those below must always be considered
in determining its reasonableness. According to the great
weight of common law authority, where the supply of water
is very small for these natural or ordinary uses, the upper
riparian owner may if necessary consuime al the water of the
stteam to supply his natural wants, but not for any other
pUPPiose.
These 7,rinciples, so admirably adapted and iiniver-
sally accepted by the courts to govern conflicting rights
in surface streams and such subterranean currents as ar,
known and defined, have almost uni-rersaliy declared inapplie
cable to subterranean waters percolating through the soil
or flowing in inknowr and-:undefinedcurrents. The practical
uncertainties and difficulty of proof caused the courts to
shrink from attempt.ing to formulate and apply a rule of law
respecting iundergrolitnd waters which should serve similarly
as a dividing line between the conflict.ing right s and duties
of property owners. They early declared that percolating
waters were part of the soil in which they were focund and na
in the eye of t",e law distinct from the earth; and left
each owner to dig down and appropriate all the water he
miht, find t,eneath, the surf'ace to his own purpose, at, his
free will nd pleasure, without regard to the effect uion
his neighbor. Utterly . lisrpgarding with respect to these
qiiestions the duty imposed u pon each p roprty owner by our .
second m axim, the first was applied, alone and unrestrictld,
in all its harshn,ss and injustice; ,.nd so the law has been
settled by a long and almost uninterrupted line of cases.
Chief JUstice Chapm:n, in the i-aaing case of Wilson v New
B,-dord (108 Mass. 265 , states tie rlie as follows: "The
percolat-ing watczr belongs to the owner of t'e La.nd as much
as the land itself, or the rocks and stones in it. Th-refor
he may ri-g 9 well and make it very large, anrl draw up the
water by machinery or othervise in such quantities as to
supply aqueducts f'or a la, ge neighborhood. He may thuis
take the water which would otherwise pass by natural per-
colation into his neighbor's land, and ,d.waw of f the water
which may come by natural percolation "rom his n'eighbor's
land".
All the decisions of the AmericAn colrts and of
E'ngland nre in virtal harmony w,'ith the rule as st, ted,
except.ing onLy the single state of New, Hamshire. The courts
of that, state have declared a, meore liberal rule, based purei,
upon principle, and ignori,.* utt ry the doctrine so well
established y exis,tinP precedents FoiLowing the a nalogy
of the law a . lied to curf'.ce s'veamns as closely as the
nature of the two tsituations adlTits, they ha.ve used the
maxim, "Sic utere"&c, to quai* the rights of ind. owners
in reg ard rto percoiatinw waters, 9nd. dr..wn between the cor-
respondent rights w "uties resulting a lividing line of
reasonable use ol one's prop -rty in ,iew of the corresponden-t
rights of others. l y this rule, a.s in the case of water
cour:ses, the ri;.':hts of the respecti.,e proprty owners are
considered correiati-vely, mRd what is such reasonable exer-
cise of one's right or privilege is to b.-. determined unde;.
all the circumstances of' each particultar c.se, from its
necessities and in view of the corres-tonding rights of
others. Here w- have ,eoctrino broadly reaching the many
in.ju.stices v.;hich the other, narrow, strict and arbitrary,
must work. Thle _principP1, if not the: only exc-ase suggested
for the general preference shown the ormer rule, is the
difficulty o f applying the l.tt.er, by reason of1 the sup-
posed imp;ossibility o knowing or provfing with reasonable
certainty the sources of su~;ply hidden b eneath th~e surface.
This may be seen by exmining the opinions of' the learned
J'ldc~es in some of t he earlier leading cases, with view
to ascertaining the motives of expediency by which they were
actuate d.
The earliest cAse in ngf.and was Acton v Blundell
(12 M.& W.336) decided in 1843. The ruli applied was impor-
td from the Civil 1aw, and stated by Jiuisti ce Maule as fol-
lows: "If a man dig a well in his own field and thereby
drains his neighbor's, he may do so unless he does it mai-
iciously". And Chief Justice Tindall, in passing upon the
case, said: "If the man who sinks the well in his own land
can acquire by that act an, absolute ri, t to the water that
collects in it,, he has the power of preventing, his neighbor
from making Rny use of the' spring in his own soil which s haij
interfere-,with the enjoyment of the well. He has the power
still further of' debarring the owner of the land in which
the spring is first found, or through which it is trans-
mitted, from draining his land or the proper cultivation
of *he soil. .. The adxantage on t1h e one side and. the
detriment on the other may bear no proportion. The well may
be sunk to supply a cottage, or a drinking; p race for cattle,
whilst the ownwr of adjoining land may be prevrented from mim
ing metal s an~d minerals ot' inestim abie value". His opinion
concludies as follows: "We think this case, for the reasons -
given, is not to be governed by the law which app ties to
rivers and flowing streams, buts that it rather falls within
the princip:le that gives the owner all that lies beneath
the surf'ace: that the land immeriately below is his pro-
prty, whether it is solid rockor porous ground, or venous
earth, or tart soil, part water: that the pers)-on who owns
the soil may dig therein and apply aJl that there is found
to his own iurlpose at his frje will and pleasure; and that
if in the exercise of such right, he intercepts and drains
o ffi the water collected from underground springs in his
neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbor falls
within the description of>"damnum absque in.iuria", which can
not be the ground for action".
In the early American cpse of lioath v Driscoll
( 20 CoTn. 533 , Jidge FilLsworth iiistifies the position
taken by the decision in the following lanpiae: "1,ach owner
has an equal ann complete right to the use of his own land
and to the water vhich is in it. Water combined with earth
or pa .sing through it, by percolation, or by filtration, or
chemical attraction,has no distinct character of ownership
prom the earth i~self, not more than the metallic oxide ot'
which the earth is composed . Wa.ter, whether mooring or
motionless in the earth, is not, in t he eye o+' the law, dis-
tinct from the errth. The laws of" its existenc-, and progres
while there, are not uniform, and cannot be known or regu-
lated. It risPs to great heights, and moves collaterally,
by influences beyond' ,our apprehension. Th-se influences are
so secret, changPable .nd uncontrollable, we cannot subject
them to the regulations, nor bui 14 upon 'hem a system of
rules, as has been done with stream upon .the surface. -- -
-W am-Were it otherwise, one man by sinking a well, thorugh
comparatively iinimportpnt, might prevent the sinking of
other wells, and the improvementof neighborhoods, by drain-
ing marshes -&c, an4 even the opening od mines of metal or
coal, a9a; the water might, not percolate with the same free-
ness and abundance as before. Beside, no man is bound to
kvnow that his neijhbor's well is supplied by wate-r. percol- ....
aing i n his own soil; and he ought-not tierefore to be
held to l ose his rights -by such continued enjoyment. He can
not know that the first well requires any ol.her than the
natural and common use of' water under the surface; nor by
what means it appears in one.place orV'the other; nor which
of the persons~who fijrst or afterwards opens the earth,
encroaches; upon the right of the other".
In t he leading Pennsylvrania c.' se of! Wheatley v
,Baugb4 2SPa.: St. 5 .8 ) the p revrailing opinion argues in the
same strain: "When the filtrations are gathered together in
suficient voLiume tohave an appreciabl e valie, and to flow
in a ciearly defined channel, it is Renerailly possible to,
spe it and to avoid diverting it, without serious detriment
to the owner of the l.nd throupvh which it flows. But per-
colations spread in every direction throutgh the earth,and it
is imossible to avoid distur'itng them without relinquishing
the necessary enjoymt-nt of the land. Accordingly, the law
has never gone so far as to recognize in one man a right
to convert :nother's farm to his own use f or the purpose of
a filter. Such a claim, if' sustained, would amount t o a
total abrogation of' the right ofiproperty. -No man-cs.uld
dig- a cellar or a well or build a house on, his own land, bee
cause these operatiuns necessarily interrupt the filtration
through the earth. 'Nor could he cut down the forest and cl-
ear his land for the purpose of husbandry, because the
evaporation which wouid be caused by exposing the earth to
the sun and air, wou1d inevitably fliminish, to some extent,
the supply of water which would otherwise filter through it.
He could not even turn a furrow for qgriculturai purposes,
because this would part ially produce t he same result. I,'ven
if this right were admitted to exist, the difficulty in as-
certaining the fact of its violation, as well as the extent
o f it, would be insurmoutable."
It seems hardly necessary to rewfer to the utter
absurdity of such a.rPnments as that the adoption of' any othe
rule wouidamourit to a total abro grtion of the right of
property, and prevTent one man from excavatinF with due care
to secutre the precious minerals and met.'Is in the soil,
because he might th4-reby cause some slight injury to his nei
ghbor's water supply. o say that a doctrine so manifestty
fair and just as that stated by t he New Nampshire courts,
having at its basis good sense and reason and looking to
the proper protection of the rights of property in view of
all the circumstanc,-s and necessities of each particular case
would hinder one from properly pursuing the tillage of the
soil or draining it in a siitable manner; or restrain him
from levelling forests and converting them into arable lands
because of the resuiting :reatly increased evaporation of the
moisture in the soil, are statements that it sounds incred-
ib e to impute to the learned ,judges Who spoke them. The
arg ment against th feasibility of adopting a rule so
difficult of application because of the Fihadowy uncertain-
ties of' its subject matter, alone remains. Somet.hing must
be offered tu explain the "myst'eriouls inf'luences and agencies,
secret, chan~eabile, and uncontroi7i able "that1'govern and
re .ulate the efistenc, and roes" of water percolating
in the sol!, a substance so easy to u.,nderstand and ready to
obey ajpoarently, iuitil it gets oft, of our sight beneath the
surface of the 9srth. We hae left then only to invoke the
aid of science t o inject into an enlighiened ,ench a few i
first elements of Thys ic,;awt st rcf.ura1 ge ology, and the
theory of the accepted doctrine is apparently exp '.oded.
That "he strict and arbitrary rule as laid riown by
these early decisions has b,-Ien found unsatisfactory, in many
cases tot ally incorsistent with well grounded principles
of right and worse than lseless as a ii-de to the courts in
soliting the difficult Situlations presented,is shown bythe
subtle ind purely fictional distincti.ons that have been re-
sotted to, ulnder pressure of necessity, to qualify it, and
that by its most persistent sipporters.
For exam,.le, take the New York case of Pixley v
lark (35 N.Y. 520 ).The injury corn lainwd of was the sat-
ura. ion of a piece of land by percolations forced through
the natu.ral banks of the river, from the increased pressure
cauised_ b 4endnt's dam raising the level of the stream.
The court uphed14 the action on a very nice riistiinction first
suggested in th~e i :ngiish cqose of Grand Junction Banal Co. v
Shugar (B.R.6 Ch. 487), between interrui~ting percolating
water on its way to . spring or stream, and abstracting i~t
by percolat, ion af, ,r having reached There. The question
arose ore directly in Village of D)elhi v Yolmans (45 N.Y.
362 )', where the proposition was stated by Judr.ge Peckham,
thus: "If te action of the defendant took the water away
from the springs after it had reached there, after it had
become part of an open ruinning stream, then the action would
lie". The same distinction is followed in many other states,
It is interestinF to note tht the courts, from the neces-
sity of preserving their better rule as t.,o surface streams,
having made thid arbitrary rule in view of" the insurmounta-
ble difficulties of' proof of prcolat ing waters, now make a
an except.ion to it, based u14;on a distinction that requires
proof not oniy of the generdl course of the percolations,
btt of their direction as well. Take the case of a perenniJ
al spring serving as an out-let to the ,urface or the
waters percolating t.hrough the gravelly stratum of a large
sect.ion of" the surroiinding country. An adjoining land
owner sinks lar~e well through the same stratum nd as a
naturai consequence the ,,olume of the spring is rereatly re-
duced. But who shall wheTher that, diminution of quantity
was 'ca.sed by an interrup-tion of the percolat ions t1hat were
the sources o " the spring; or an a:bstraction of the water of
the spring itself ne~riy as fa.st as "fhev reach-d it; or
can we properly say that eit.h~r one or the other is the
fact separately and~not the t,'.o toget.her? )r, having proven
caerfuIly the general course and direction of the percola-
tions, and haiing determined whether such enormois and unI-
reasonabie well may or may not ;:e ma intained, according as
iTs proJector -has taken car, to locate it relatively to the
direction of the cirrent, on one side of the spring or the
other, where now is tfhe excuse for not adj-.udicting the
case in a)ccordance .witfh the doctrine of reasonable use and
in view of the correspondent rights of the respective pro-
perty owners, since the percolations ha-ve become as welI,
kno-?,n and d-fined by reasonable inference as the law re-
quires of t.he subterranean currents to which that doctrine
does apply.
Three comrarativeiv recent case.s in Massachuset.ts
in the same-direction ar. entertaining as illustrations of -
the elastic pos-sibitities in-volved in distinguishing care-
fully the case in point from such precedents as seem, t o_,"the
layma,n, at, le4.4 somewhat similar.
In the first, Bailey 'v-Wor.urn (126 Mass. 416),
the towm had taken lands on the ,order of a pond and con-
structed on it a water gallery .frorm which to supply the in-
habitanta .with water. Direct: ..: connection between ga.llery
and p~ond was manie ey pipes, but it was found unnecessary to
use= them by reason of the filtration. It was held that the
ripl} hto use the nipes e-xi stad nevertheless, an4 that, t his
was taking the water within th meaning of the statute au-
thorizing the act.
In Ae.tna ,ils v iaL t,'ham (126 iss. 422 the
facts were precisely the same ':xc--ptt hat, there was no
direct, connection withi the stream. An artificiaI embankment
on te border formed o(ne side of the water gallery and part
of the water sltpp~y filererd tlrough it f'rom the river.
This was also Keld t aking the water fr,)m the river under
the statute.
In the third cse, Aetna VjTili IT Brookline (127
MO.ss. 69 ), the town constructe4 itts wter gliery on land
conveyed to it, by quitctlaim. deed near the river from which
it was authoriz'A to take water under statite. Bt inding
that the water percolating1 into the gallery was sufficient,
they mqde no connect ion with the river, directly or indir-
ectly, and defended, squiarely on the right to the percolations
in or coming to their own and, admitting that some of it
cpMe from the river. The opinion discusses the general rle
a.s sta~ted un Wiison v New Bedford ( Supra and mentionc, the
exception, or rather distinction, made by Grand Junction
(',anal Co. v Shugar (SuTra), of' taking the water of a. de-
f'ined stream by percolation, but appa:rently rei~uct~antto, come
out sqyIarely in favor of such exception iintil compelled to,
they avoi.d. the question by resorting to P.n exagge ration of
their grofn of' ecision in the preceding cses, and hold
simiy that taking by percolation is suifficient within the
meaning of the statuite.
An earlier assachusetts case is cited by the
text writers as a leading authority Tor the rather startling
proposition, in view of the established law -as to per-
colating wat''rs in that state, that irrespective of the
question whether the .iv ersion is by intercepting the per-
colations that form the spr ing or not, a rialroad company
is liable in damages if an excavation made for its road
drains a well on land ad.jacent bit not crossed by its line.
The learned .judge, after stating in his opinion that the
rile as to adjacent prolertv owners is exactly oppositedeci
des the case,justly but not logically, upon a distinction
between ownership and the special usufructuary right of the
r-alroad. The owner of the property ,hrou-<h which the road
rassed might. cleariy have made the excaration, or any one
else to whom he chose to give t.he rihtt to make it, without
liability bei~ng incurred to t~e adjacent owner by either.
But the law that governs a. monied railroad cor oration is
apparently a different thing altoget her.
It wi*i ;e oted that t-he cases present the
question of th, ownership of percolating waters in two dis-
finct aspects: the one involiinr the qutestion of' the re-
se, ctive rights to the use of the water itself', whi'le the
other deals with the right to use lbhe property, the qu. .stion
o" ri-ht to the w ater in it arisilg only incidentally as
the iartictardrection in which th- act of the defendant
upon his own land, lawful but, unreasonable, causes injury
to the plaintiif. Th e real reason for reqching a solution
of the problemso little in accord with fundamental .jtstice,
as the generally accepted rule is, seems to me to lie
wholly in this latter class of ca.ses, all th-at the courts
have said about the practical uncertainties of its subject
matter notwithstanding. There exists no real reason in
theory or practice why the respecti-TP rights of adjacent
l nd ownwrs iri tiie waters perclating through the soil,
should not be adjudicated according to, a rulie as well adap-
ted to secure the best and fullest enjoyment of' landed
prop rty as that which governs surface streams. The water
itself is no less vailuable, ad h~s to he resorted to as
tlwe source of sutpply far oftener, both by reasonof the
scarcity of natural streams and the, poor quliity of the
water f'outnd in them. Large sections of countr.j are supplied
wholly by wells ta.kin!, their souirce in the filtrations of
the soil, without. which the land itself' would ire uninhabita-
bie and vorthiess. But to say thiat the use;e- of' percolating
water is a right which each property ownwr must, exercise
resona-dy and in view of the wants and nec.essities of his
neighbor, iT .or the court-s to recopnize in it. such a right
of i.roperty as the, cannot consistently tot,lly dirregard
in the second class of' cases, where tie diversioy df 1Ie
filtra- ons is caused ov a lawful, t ,hoivh unreasonable, use
of' ore's property, hut without any intention or desire,
eithpr to 4eprive his neighbor of the water, or secur-, it
for himse~f.
At all iimes the courts h,,e been reluctant, to
abridrge by .a.ny ].itation whatsoeer the absolutelUfreedoni
of the individual to use 9nd enjoy his own property as he
sees Hit, so !.onP as he acts law'tiLy. So st-eadfastly have
some re, isted any encroachment upon this ield, as to deny
reconpition even to the ewxception maide hy the fivil Law,
of acts instipated yv malice,, ma.intaining that, the exercise
of a legal right cannot, in any case, be aiffected by the
motiv,-o which controls it,. But .rant.ing that the court's
should be conservative in yielding, the posi tion is never-
the less one that cannot r-e st rictly maintained. That, they
haVe frequently been compeiled to Iiepart rom it .actually,
thoph perhaps not opniy, is seen in the a-1lication of the
*maxim, "Sic ftere"Ppc, to c>rses of wat,,.r cours~es, highw-ys,
%iple. ld nuis mncs in regard to air, and -y noises, nd
numero,s other familiar instances. A rule i, that ives to one
thie right t.o use his property as he ch,,oses absolnt,.-VLy, does
not, insure him the fullest ]po,"sible enjoyment of it, since
it is to such a, depree dependent on the conduct of surround-
prop ,-rty o wners, and the same privilege must be extended to
In the particular ,iirection we are considering,
the rep-ined rtidstinctionl; made whenever p ossible to alleviate
th h harshness of: the strict rule, and. the illogical and in-
consistent d.cisions that have resulted, indicate clearly t'.
the tendency of the law under the pressure of necessity.
Two comparativliy recent decisions are i.nteresting to note
in this connection.
l-n innard v Standard Oil Co. (7 L.1R.A. 45i5 'a
Kentucky c.se decidle,i in t890. he leakage of oil, stored in
iqrge quantities on dei'end'nt's land, damaged plaintiff's
spring by corrupting the percu lat ions that supplied it. ft
was squarely held that, although one may ap] ropriate all
the und. rground water in his soii, he. still has not the
righ, to c,,ntaminate it, so that, when it. reaches his neigh-
bors' lpnd it will be, unfit, for use by either man or beast.
The wisdom, the absolute necessity, of reaching that con-
ciusion in such cqses is obviou,' bu" no le.;s so is the
logicnlinconsistency of' ihp two propolsitiois. fn comm -nt-
ing upon the 1.ery res.ectable line o. authorities that have
taken -a. similar stand, Judge. Cooley, in 'ipjohn v lichland
Township ( 46 Mich. 542 X very -ptly says: *Bu, if with-
drawing the water from one's well by an excavation on ad-
joining lands will give no right of' action, it, is difficult
to unde rstand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of
+he adjoining premises can be actionab.?e, when there is no
actuai intent to injure and no negligence. The one act de-
strolys the well, and the other does no more; the injury, is
the same in kind and degree in the twos cases.
Perhaps a, still better illustration of the in-
surmountable i"ficuities that must, sooner or later, con-
front all courts in their a.ttempted adherence to so unress-
(nable a rile, is the case of Golins v ,hprtiers Valley
Gas Co.( 131 Pa.Sti,. 143Y. The defendant Gas Company drilled
well upon their land, in consequence of which salt water
found in a lower stratum'., arose and. mixed with the fresh
water of an upper st.ratum,, and ruined 1i t~he wells of the
surro' iding: secti. on of country. The well was drill ed in
the ordinary manner, a.nd in all respects suitable for the
pur ose for which it was intended, but the contamination of
the f'resh water by the s, it could ha're been forseen by reas-
onable i n f-renc, and prevented (at a slight, additional ex-
pense. The equities of' the case so clearly necessitated a
modification of the established rtle in the interest of the
pub].ic good, that the courts were constrained to. sustain
the contention of the plaintiffs, and chose the ground of
negligence as the basis for their departure. The decision
i-s well considered and will serve, presumably, as 9, prece-
dent tor the redress of numerots injuries that before were
unjustly s, yied,"dpmnum absque injuria,".
Negiigenc: implies the lack of reasonable care,
or care proportional to the risk under all the circumstances
of egach particularcase; and the circumstances that serve in
these cases as the standard of' ci.re to be exercised, are
simply the wants nd necessities of the surrounding land
owners. In regard then to our more d ifficult, class of
cases, we find the cout'ts of Pennsylvania and New Hampshire
in exact harmony by ,rirtue of rules differently stated, but
pr.cisely the same in effect: that where one excavates upon
or otherwise uses his iand, but not for the purpose of col-
lecting th!e filtrations for himself, he must act, in regard
to -them, not only lawf'ully but without negligence ; o~r, in
ot-her vords, in a manner that under all the ci.rcumstances
of the pa..rticular cp-se is reasonable, in view of the wants
:nd necessities of his neighbors. But , bound by precedents
that they hesit:),te w ,olly to overthrow, the Pennsyivania
coiirts still adhere to the strict rule in the other simpler
Pnd no -ess equite.ble cla.ss of cases, where othe excavation
is for the express purpose of collecting the filtrations:
to which it had probably never been applied but for the the
d ifficulties involved in the analagous line of cases in re-
spect to which they have now departed from it. As the law
of Pennsyi-anie now stands, apparently one who sinks a
shaft to reach valuab e minerals in the soil, and thereby
injures the neighboring weils, when he might reasonably
have avoided so doing, is liable; while if the same injuiry
is caused by the sinking o8' an immense well for the express
purpose of co.llecting the f'iltrations, no matter how useless
or unreasonable it may be, it is wholly without redress.
In the opinion of the ca.se just, discussed, Mr.
Justice Mitchell, in commenting upon the fact that, negii-
p ence, or care proportional to the risk, presupposes knowl-
edge, more or less perfect, of the conditions involved,
finds such kno ,ledge in the practical in 'ormat ion gained by
sinking wells almost witho'it number throughout, the stae,
d-uring recent years, and says with a frankness tha t is at,
Least rffrgshing: "If' this is the state of knowledge at the
present day, .-.. then, clearly, it wou'd be a. violation
of the living spirit o-f the law not to recognize the change,
and. :-,Tpiy the .settled and immutab'e princil-.ies, of right to,
the altered con4itions of fact. Granting that the earlier
judges were actua.ted by the most praistv.,orthy motives of
expedi-ncy, n.nd built t.s best they could amid. the difficul-
ties by which they were confronted, are we justified in
suffering in our midst a crumbling cr:.7ation of ancient law,
from beneath which advanced science has removed the last bit
of foundation, to fail, piece by piece, upon the innofen-
sire victims of its injustice, until it has wrought its
own .H estruction?
